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ABSTRACT
Investment abroad has come to play a major role in thetotal invest-
ment undertakenbyU.S. firms. Despite this development, very littleattentLon
has been paid to the impacts of domestic tax policy on foreigninvestment.
One reason has been the presumption that, sincechanges in domestiu
tax rules ordinarily also apply to foreign—source income,policy changes should
affect foreign and domestic investment similarly. However,the fact that the
tax on foreign—source income is deferred until theincome is repatriated repre-
sents a crucial difference in the treatment of foreignand domestic income. So
long as the U.S. tax is deferred, theeffective U.S. tax rate on foreign—source
income can be shown to be irrelevant to a firm' s optimalforeign reinvestment
decision. Foreign investment is now largely accomplished byfirms reinvesting
earnings abroad, so the reinvestment decisionis of primary importance. Thu ,a
decrease in the effective U.S. tax rate which appliesto both domestic and
foreign investment income can be thought of as acut in the tax on domestic
investment income, which is encouraging to domestic investment(perhaps at the
expense of foreign investment),combined with a cut in the tax on foreign
investment income, which has no effect on the optimal foreignreinvestment deci-
sion. Consequently, the impacts on foreign and domesticinvestment of an
apparently neutral policy could be very different.
Another reason that the response of foreign investment hasbeen
neglected in domestic policy discussions is the lackof evidence on the magnt—
tude of that response. This paper utilizes the theory justdescribed to confirm
that foreign investment is influenced negatively and quitestrongly by the
after—tax rate of return to domestic investment. A further test,in which a
"grossdomestic rate of return" term and a "domestic tax" term areincluded
separately, produces coefficients virtually equalin absolute value, confirming
that the net domestic rate of return is the appropriatevariable. The results
indicate that a tax incentive which has been found to raisenet domestic invest-
ment by a dollar reduces net foreign investment by at least twentycents. This
conclusion is further reinforced by results from a forward—looking(Tobin's q)
model.
While these results do not point to the primary outcomeof a domestic
policy change being a domestic—foreign reallocationof the capital stock, they
indicate that a significant reallocation does take place.With open econony tax
analysis still in its infancy, the question of howthis evidence alters the
usual conclusions is largely an open one.
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The rate of investment in the United States has recentlybecome the
focus of unprecedented concern. Feldstein (1981),for example, demonstrates
that net fixed nonresidential investment as a fractionof GNP dropped by nearly
forty percent between the late l960's and thelate 1910's. He has also argued
that much of the investment decline can be attributedto tax laws and, in
particular, to the interaction of tax lawswith the high rates of inflation
experienced in the l910s.l Recent initiatives toalter the tax treatment of
capital income have been based, at least in part, on adesire to increase th
rate of capital formation.
At the same time that increasing the rate of domesticinvestment bs
become an objective of tax policy, foreign investment byU.S.—based firms ha3
come to play a major role in the totalbusiness investment undertaken. Inded,
foreigninvestment as a fraction of GNP grew at nearly the samerate as dome3tic
investment fell over the most recent decade.
In the theoretical public finance literature,serious attention is for
the first time being devoted to the possible inadequaciesof the closed—ecOfl)rnY
models of taxation on which our predictions of taxeffects are based. For
example, Goulder, Shoven, and 1Jhalley(forthcoming) have recently demonstrated
that savings and investment incentives can produceoutcomes that differ grealy
depending on the elasticities of internationalinvestment with respect to ra;es
of return at home and abroad. Unfortunately,there is virtually no evidence on
10/09/81—2—
which to base an assumption about thesecrucial parameters.
In fact, even the size of U.S. foreign investmentrelative to dom€tic
investment has often been poorly understood. It isargued here that, becaus
figures on foreign investment should be compared to netdomestic investment,
investment abroad by U.S. firms has reached levelsapproximately as high as ialf
of the domestic counterpart in recentyears. With foreign investment of thi;
magnitude, it is at least plausible that the closedecononr models of taxatin
would lead to inaccurate conclusions,regarding the impacts of investment an
savings policies on total investment.
This paper examines the importance of theresponse in U.S. foreign
direct investment to changes in domestic tax policy..2First, a brief review of
the recent pattern of direct investment and of theliterature on its deter-
minants will be presented. In Section II,a simple theory of foreign investient
is developed. Evidence from the past fifteenyears is then used to both
strongly confirm the implications of the theory and to indicate theexistenc of
highly significant domestic policy effects on foreign investment.In the
conclusion, the importance of these results for domestic policyanalysis is
considered.
I. Foreign Investment and Existing Evidence on Its Determinants
As noted in the introduction, investment abroad hascome to occupy a
major position in the total investment undertaken by U.S. firms. AsFigure J
illustrates, increases in foreign investment coupled with domesticinvestmen.,
declines have resulted in foreign investment between aboutone—third and one--
half as large as net domestic fixed investment.Indeed, foreign direct inve3t—






















































































































































































































































































































































by over 115 percent, while the comparable domestic measure fellby nearly 40
percent. It should be noted that foreign direct investment isa figure most
accurately compared to net domestic investment, since onecomponent of foreign
investment, earnings reinvested abroad, is net of depreciation allowances.3
The fact that foreign direct investment is by naturea net figure
helps explain why the situation depicted in Figure 1diverges so significantly
from the popular perception of the relative size offoreign to domestic
investment. Goldsbrough (1919), for example, illustrates therelative impor-
tance of direct investment by reporting that it is lessthan five percent as
large as gross domestic fixed capital formation.
These figures demonstrating the importance offoreign investment might
also seem surprising in light of the important andwidely—cited conclusion of
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that domestic savings and domesticinvestment are
very closely linked; that is, most of the world appears to be best characterized
as consisting of economies nearly closed to net international investmentflows.
One explanation is that the previous result was basedon a study of a cross—
section of countries, so the U.S., as only oneobservation, does not necessarily
exhibit such a savings—investment relationship. Moreimportantly, net business
fixed investment represents only a small fraction of totalgross national
investment. So, while investment abroad is a largepart of the net investment
undertaken by U.S. firms, it may not appear significantas a fraction of total
national savings or investment.
The existence of sizable foreign investment flows doesnot, of course,
hold any implication for the role of rates of return (and,hence, tax rates)
in determining investment flows. In fact, efforts to relate thelevel of_)4
foreigninvestment to rates of return at home and abroad have met with a
striking lack of success.5 Hufbauer (1915) was led to the conclusion thatthere
is no "observable connection between HNC expansion, cost of capital at home,and
average earnings on investment abroad. The behavior of MNCs mighthave ratier
little to do with the classical theory of foreign investment." As a result,
studies of direct investment have often resorted to explaining U.S. investment
abroad based on investment levels in the U.S. (Herring and Willett (1912) arid
Kohihagen (1911)), on GNP in the host countries (Scaperlanda and Mauer(l97)),
or on total investment levels in the host countries (Snoy(1975)).
Notable exceptions to the ad hoc nature of much of the work on fo'eign
investment are the Jorgenson—type neoclassical investment models, which hav
been estimated for foreign investment by, for example, Stevens (1972), Kwack
(1912), and Goldsbrough (1919). While these models provide good explanations of
foreign investment, it can be argued that the encouraging results are mainly
attributableto the numerator of the "optimal capital stock" term (output or
foreign subsidiaries), rather than the denominator(the cost of capital) which
isof primary interest for policy analysis. In fact, none of thesemodels
incorporates tax effects in the cost of capital measure,but it would be
straightforward to replace the cost of capital term by the tax—adjustedcost of
capital, as Kopits (1972) has done in his study ofdividend remittances. One
could also test the separate significance of the tax—adjusted costof capitii
term andtheoutput term.
There are more serious questions about the applicability ofthe
neoclassical investment model, however. One important aspect of themodel i
that there is no connection between the domestic and foreigninvestment deci——5—
sionsof the firm. That is, the foreign subsidiary is implicitly viewed as a
perfect competitor, even with the domestic parent firm. With foreign production
and domestic production often representing alternative means of serving the same
markets, this characterization leaves a good deal to be desired.
Looked at in a slightly different way, the neoclassical closed—economy
investment model is used to determine the combination of factors optimally used
to produce a given output. The foreign investment decision, by contrast to the
closed—economy investment decision, primarily concerns the location of
production. Thking the location of production (the level of foreign subsidiary
output) as given in a model of foreign investment neglects the most interesting
aspect of the problem.
As we shall see in Section III, the recent evidence suggests that a
simple economic model which meets these objections can be used to successfully
explain annual movements in direct investment and to test for the effects of
taxes. A crucial element in that success is the careful theoretical specifica-
tion of the influence of tax policy. The next section is devoted to a
discussion of the determinants of foreign investment and, in particular, the
influence of taxes.
II. xes and Foreign Investment
Ouranalysisof foreign investment begins with the familiar proposi-
tion of classical foreign investment theory that firms tend to invest more
abroad as the rate of return available abroad rises and as that available at
home declines. This simple specification is best thought of as the product of a
disequilibrium model of investment, in which a firm's decision to invest at home
or abroad is a function of the differential return available abroad.6 It—6—
raises, however, a fundamental questionabout the nature of the substitutability
of foreign for home investment.In particular, the classical theory appearsto
neglect the possibility of expansion
both at home and abroad up to the pointt
which the marginal return to capital equalsthe marginal (debt) cost, in whic
case the firm's domestic rateof return would be irrelevant in itsforeign
investment decision.
As was noted in the previous section,foreign and domestic production
are often alternative methodsof serving the same market, so thenotion of
5ubstitutability among different locationsof production is well established.A
fully consistent story can betold of a firm deciding between foreignand
domestic investments, either of whichwould tend to drive both rates of return
down toward the cost of funds, on thebasis of such factors as taxes andlocali
wages which are reflectedin current measured rates of return.
A further reason for foreigninvestment to compete with domestic
investments can be introduced by appealingto either externally— or internally—
imposed financial constraints onthe firm. The existence of externalfinancial
constraints has been the subject of a lengthy
debate which will not be repeated
here. Clearly, if a firm's decisionto transfer capital to a foreignsubsidiary
cannot be accompanied by increased
borrowing to finance the previouslevel of
domestic operations, there is aforeign-dOme5tic tradeoff. Similarly, afirm
might impose a target debt—equity
ratio on itself as an internalcontrol mecta.—
nism for requiring managers to justify
their plans.1 Thus, the theorythat
foreign investment is a functionof alternative rates of return canbe justified
on a number of grounds.
Even granting the classicalmodel a solid theoretical foundatiofl,
it—7—
isfrequently asserted that any measure of available returnsneglects such
important determinants of expected return as to beempirically useless. Such
factors as the desire of innovative, oligopolistjc firmsto exploit their par-
ticular advantages in production or distribution, andthe presence of impediments
to international trade, no doubt play a major role inexplaining the existence of
multinational firms, as does the quest forstability through vertical
integration.8 However, unlesswe include in our study a period in which firms
are discovering and exploiting major new opportunitiesabroad, the factors which
explain the existence of multinational firmsmay not so strongly cause year—to—
year variations in foreign investment. Bather, as is shown in the nextsection,
measured rates of return can account for a great deal of thefluctuation in
investment over recent years.
The complexity of the tax treatment of foreignsource income makes
necessarya careful specification of the net—of--tax rate of return to which
foreign investment would beexpectedto respond. Thegovernmentsofhost
countrieshave the first opportunity to tax the returnsproduced in their
jurisdictions. The rate of return net of the foreigncorporate income tax can
be written as:
rfj =r*(l—t*) (i)
where r* is the gross rate of return earned abroad9 and tis the effective
rate of host country taxation.Foreign countries often collect another tax (a
"withholding tax") at a time dividends are paid totheparent company. The
return, after total foreign taxes, on a one—period investment with income
repatriated to the parent firm can, therefore, be written as:—8—
raft
=r*(l-t*)(l-t) (2)
The U.S., in turn collects on foreign source income a tax at the regu-
lar corporate rate, but allows a credit for taxes paid to the foreign governnent
(up to the level of the U.S. tax liability). The U.S. tax is ordinarily
collected only upon repatriation of profits to the U.S. parent. Thus,the
parentfirm can receive a net—of—tax rate of return from an investment abroad
of:
=r*(l—t),if t t +t—t*t
(3)
=r*(l—t*)(i—t),otherwise
where t is the effective U.S. tax rate on foreign—source income, priorto the
credit.1°
Obviously the effective tax rate on foreign source incomeis affected,
in all except the "excess credits" case, by the firm's decisionof whether to
repatriate earnings. The question of how to characterizethis feature of the
tax system in a tractable model of the foreign investmentdecision has plagued
researchers. Horst (1911) takes the approach of weighting the taxliabilities
by the fraction of foreign—source income typically paid out,to derive an after—
tax return:




where p is the foreign subsidiary payout ratio.—9—
Thespecification is deceptively simple, however. First, the dividend
payout ratio is chosen by the firm and, in general, will depend on the tax
rates, so the temptation to interpret an average of tax rates weighted by an
observable payout ratio as the appropriate influence over marginal investment
decisions should be avoided.11Also, expression (Ii) is appropriate only if a
firm which is making a marginal investment will continue topay out the current
fraction p of its earnings over the live of the investment. Finally, is
derived by assuming that direct investment abroad is accomplished by an explicit
transfer of funds from the parent to the subsidiary, rather than the implicit
transfer implied by a retention of earnings by a foreign subsidiary.
In fact, Hartman (1981) argues that U.S. foreign direct investment now
typically is accomplished by foreign subsidiaries retaining earnings.
Furthermore, the nature of the U.S. tax system provides a strong incentive for
foreign subsidiaries to be self—financing to the greatest extent possible. That
is, the present value of tax liabilities is reduced, without any corresponding
change in financial characteristics of the firm, if a foreign subsidiary retains
it.s earnings, rather than paying dividends to its parent while receiving from
the parent additional explicit direct investment (whether in the form of debt or
equity). The reason for this strong result is that U.S. taxes are due only upon
the repatriation of earnings. Thus, it is not surprising that dividend payments
are discouraged, unless a net financial transfer from the subsidiary to the
parent is desired. This proposition is not completely general in the complex
universe of interacting tax systems, as is clear from an example considered by
Alworth (1981).If a host country provides so high a level of dividend relief
to foreign—owned subsidiaries that the firm's total current tax burden declines—10—
with higher repatriation rates, a firm will tend to accelerate rather than defer
its dividend payments to its parent. As a general proposition, however, the
logic underlying expression ()4)—— thata U.S. firm undertaking a transfer of
funds abroad is receiving dividends at rate p which is expected to continue
over the life of the investment ——isopen to question.
The importance of this insight rests in its implications for the
financing of a marginal investment. Based on this theory, the marginal direct
investment comes at the expense to the parent firm of a repatriated dollar, up
to the point of subsidiary profits being exhausted. For total investments
larger than available earnings, the marginal investment is financed by an expli—
cit transfer from the parent.
A. Retained Ernings
Consider, first, the subsidiary deciding whether to reinvest for one
period or to repatriate a dollar of after—foreign—income tax earnings.
(i—t) Repatriation gives the parent (it*) dollars to invest at, say, anet domestic
rate of return r, or, at the end of the period, (i+re).Reinvestment
produces 1 +r*(l—t*)of foreign earnings or, upon repatriation to the parent
at the end of the period, (i +r*(i—t*)).12That is, a firm can pay
the U.S. tax, thereafter earning a rate of return r or can defer theU.S. tax
but later pay the same rate on the original dollar plus the rate ofreturn that
dollar earns in the interim. Thus, the present value of tax payments tothe
U.S. on a dollar of foreign—source income, when discounted atr*(l_t*), are
equal in the two cases. Therefore, the relevant net foreignrate of return Lo
be compared to the opportunity cost (re) of investingabroad is the after—
foreign—income—tax rate of return. As discussed in moredetail by Hartinan—11--
(1981), this argument is not crucially dependent on the one—period nature of
this example, as long as repatriation of earnings from abroad is expected to
occur eventually.13
This result highlights the crucial role of deferral, in cases of the
U.S. tax rate on foreign—source income exceeding the foreign tax rate. If
deferral were not available, a higher U.S. tax would obviously represent a
disincentive to reinvestment abroad. The conventional analysis of the tax
system, including deferral, which relies on some weighted average formula simi-
lar to equation (1), still incorporates a disincentive effect of higher U.S.
taxes on foreign—source income.1 As we have seen, once both the current and
future tax liabilities relevant to the repatriation decision have been taken
into account, the U.S. tax on foreign source income is neutral with respect to
the reinvestment decision. Of course, the U.S. tax is entirely irrelevant when
the foreign tax rate exceeds the U.S. tax rate on foreign—source income. Thus,
within our general model foreign investment accomplished by retaining foreign
earnings abroad can be described by:
=T* (..*(i — t*)) (c) re n'
This general neutrality of the U.S. tax treatment of foreign source
income has important implications for the country's mix of domestic and foreign
investment, since the U.S. tax law treats domestic and foreign investment income
similarly, except for the deferral of foreign—source income and depreciation
provisions to be discussed below. That is, while an increase in the general rate
of corporate income taxation decreases the alternative rate of returnrn, it has
no effect on r*(1 —t*)and, hence, it tends to encourage foreign reinvestment—12—
of earnings. The extent of this encouragement is the topic ofSection III.
B. Transfers of Funds
The tax effects on the foreign investment accomplished by atransfer
of funds from parent to subsidiary are less straightforward, depending onanti-
cipated paths of investment in the future. Th.ke, first,the case of a U.S. tax
higher than the corresponding—foreign tax. We know fromthe discussion above
that after an investment project begins to generate earnings,the rate of reLurn
on reinvestment, appropriate for comparison with thedomestic rn, is the after—
foreign—income tax rate of return. Thus, we can view aninvestment abroad as
earning a present value of r(1 —t)in the first period, but also gaining a
firm access to the higher return r(1 —t*)on earnings reinvested, because of
the deferral of the U.S. tax. The future reinvestment opportunitieswill, as a
consequence, affect current decisions. Suppose,for example, that r* is
expected to be so low in the future that only a one—periodinvestment is con—
templated. Then, the relevant effective tax rate onforeign—source income is t,
since there is no deferral advantage. On the other hand,if repatriation of
earnings will be deferred indefinitely, the valueof reinvesting at the higher
return may come to dominate the decision, in which casethe firm's decision takes
on the character of the reinvestment decisiondiscussed above. So, the relevant
tax rate on foreign source income is between tand t, with the exact vaue
depending on the set of future investmentopportunities.'5 Of course, if the
foreign tax exceeds the U.S. tax, some combinationof the foreign corporate
income tax and the foreign withholding tax is the importantparameter. Thus for
a new investment, we can write the general expression:
* * * It=It(rn,r*, r*t, r*t*, r*tw(l —t*)) (6)—13—
where the I- function is specific to the particular firm being considered.
It could well be highly unstable in aggregate form.
III. Domestic Taxes and Reinvestment Abroad
Fortunately, since reinvestment of foreign source income accounts for
nearly ninety percent of U.S. direct investment abroad, the theory of this
source of direct investment, given by equation (5),isby far the more straight-
forward. In order to facilitate comparison with Feldstein's results on tax
impacts on domestic investment as a fraction of GNP, a simple linear rela-
tionship is chosen for estimation:
1*
=a+ + 2r*(1—t*) (T)
where Y is U.S. GNP.16 In measuring real net rates of return, it is important
to correct for the tax laws' mismeasureinent of profits and to take account of
all the taxes paid. t.ta on rn are taken from Feldstein (forthcoming), where
considerable attention has been paid to the accurate measurement of depreciation
and to the taxes paid by corporations, shareholders, and creditors in the U.S.
By contrast, only the taxes paid currently by the foreign subsidiary to the
foreign government are relevant in the construction of r*(l —t*),so, aside
from the mismeasurement of profits under a nrriad of foreign tax systems, the
foreign variable is directly observable.17
The use of reported after—tax earnings is problematic, but information
on depreciation and inventory accounting is not available, so no adjustment can
be made. Measurement errors in r*(l —t*)will be systematically related to
1*
measurement errors in —,sowe can anticipate the estimate 2 being—1 14...
biased. A bias will, in general, occur in our estimate as well, but, as
we will see, these problems do not appear to be serious.
When (7) is estimated using annual date for the 15 years 1965—1919, we
obtain: 18
're=.003136-.o6ir +.1412r*(1_t*) -.00186D714 (8)
(.0001489) (.oo198 (.oo1414) (.0001489)
=937
D.W. =2.15
(standard errors in parentheses) SER .000)405
These results imply that the simple model of foreign direct investment deve-
loped in the previous section provides for successful explanation. Of par-
ticular interest, here, is the highly significant negative estimated impact of
the domestic real net rate of return. Even more significant is the rate of
return to U.S. investment abroad, although, as mentioned above, it is
constructed in such a way as to introduce spurious correlation with Ie
Equation (8) has very important implications for the impact of
domestic tax policy on foreign investment. Before exploring these implications,
further tests are performed to confirm the result. First, since r can be
thought of as r(l — where is the effective tax rate on domestic
income, the variable can be split into a "gross rate of return" term r and a
"tax" term rt5 .Thisproduces the result:





Asexpected due to the corriation of r with rtus,itis difficult to esti—
mate precisely the separate tax effect. However, the similarity of ther and
rt5 coefficients certainly supports the hypothesis.that r(l —t5)is the
appropriate variable. 19
As noted above, these results cannot be taken too seriously without
addressing the issue of bias caused by the measurement error in the real after—
foreign—tax rate of return r*(1 —t*),and its correlation with the measurement
error in foreign investment. Since it is the domestic variables on which we
will place major emphasis, it is reassuring that the correlation ofrn and
r*(l —t*)is only —.03.
To confirm that the potential bias is small, equation (8) was reesti—
mated using instrumental variables. The real after—foreign—tax rate of return
r*(i —t*)was instrumented using variables expected to be related to worldwide
real capital returns but not the measurement error in r*(l —t*).
Specifically, current and lagged employment, industrial production, and the real
GNP of the seven most significant host countries were weighted by their share of
U.S. foreign investment.20 While these variables explained only 81.1 percent of
the variation in r*(1 —t*),inthe first stage regression, the following
results emerged:
.003796 —.O67r + r*(1_t*) —.00185D71 (10) Y





= .003696-.0681r +.0701rt5 +.003r*(l_t*) —.ooi8yD7 (ii)




These instrumental variables estimates are virtually identical to the ordinary
least squares results reported as equations (8) and (9), implying that we can
have a great deal of confidence in the estimated domestic tax impacts. Thken
together, the empirical results have the important implication that a tax change
which makes domestic investment more attractive will significantly reduce
foreign investment. Furthermore, they are supportive of the theory developed in
Section II, with respect to the impact of a change in the tax rate applied to
all corporate income.
While the tax rate on domestic income, t5 ,differsfrom the U.S. tax
rate on foreign source income, t (for example, foreign subsidiaries are not
allowed to use accelerated depreciation and do not receive the investment tax
credit), annual fluctuations in the two series, which result largely from the
inflation—induced mismeasurement of taxable profits, are undoubtedly highly
correlated. The fact that the r and rt5 coefficients are virtually iden—
tical in absolute value would, thus, seem to be very strong evidence that t does
not affect foreign investment. M noted above, a specification including a
separate tus variable serves to reinforce our conclusion. The weight of the
evidence., therefore, strongly supports the basic proposition that even an
apparently non—discriminatory tax change is far from neutral in its effects on
the domestic—foreign investment decision.
These results can be placed in perspective by reference to the—11—
Feldsteinconclusions. His estimated coefficient of rn's impact on domestic
investment as a fraction of GNP for the 195I_1918 period is •)459•21 When his
equation wasre—runfor the 1965—1979 period, incorporating the major revisions
tothe net domestic investment figures performed in early 1981, the coefficient
was reduced to.312, with a standard error of .072. Thus, a change in tax
policy affecting domestic investment has an opposing effect on foreign invest-
ment (by retained earnings) approximately twenty percent as large. How the ana-
lysis of domestic policy changes might be affected by this factor will be con-
sidered later, but first we turn to the estimation of tax effects on "immature"
foreign operations, i.e., those not generating sufficient earnings to finance
their investments.
IV. Domestic xes and "New" Direct Investment
Compared to reinvested earnings, the explanation of capital transfers
to foreign affiliates presents serious difficulties of both a conceptual and an
empirical nature. One obvious problem is the complexity and ambiguity of the
possible tax effects discussed above. The unavailability of tax data also
requires unattractive compromises. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the
return on the existing stock of U.S. capital abroad has much relevance to firms
which are primarily involved in the beginning phases of new investments. ken
together, these factors are not encouraging to empirical work, so it is not
surprising that the results are not as significant as those in the case of
reinvestment.
The most obvious problems encountered in estimating the tax effects
included in equation (6) is the lack of reliable data on the effective foreign
corporate tax rate t ,theforeign withholding rate t, and the effective—18—
U.S.tax rate on foreign—source income t. While one could construct average
effective tax rates from tax return information, only the rates on repatriated
earnings are reported and there is little reason to believe such information is
representative. Consequently, instead of estimating the appropriate equation
(6),weare forced to use an equation like (11):
4 = + +2r*(1
—t*)+tusr*(1
—t*) (ii)
The estimates produced by this equation could be meaningful if two conditions
are met. First, if, as argued above, t ,theeffective U.S. tax rate on
domestic income, is highly correlated through time with the effective U.S. tax
rate on foreign source income, t ,itcan be used as a proxy for unobservable t
as shown. Also, if variations through time in r*(1 —t*)primarily result from
variations in r* ,equation(ii) may provide an unbiased estimate of the effect
of domestic taxes, though, of course, no information about the effect of t*
Unfortunately, all of these problems appear to cause the noise in the
regression to overwhelm the signal, as shown by the result (12).
4= .OO3I+.0178r+.O251r*(l_t*)—.O53Gtusr*(l_t*)
—.OOO421D714(12)




Whilethe equation implies the expected positive response to the foreign rate of
return and negative response to the tax parameter, the estimated coefficients
are so insignificant as to be nearly meaningless. The instrumental variables—19—
estimation procedure (equation (13)) produces the anticipated sign for the
coefficient as well, the coefficients are again so imprecisely estimated as
not to be usefull for analysis.
=.006066—.0152r+.2456r*(1_t*)—.3625tusr*(l_t*)—.00411D14(13)




Thus, we must conclude that based on the available information, one can say very
little about the domestic tax effects on the foreign investment of firms with
relatively new operations abroad.
V. Further Confirmation of the Results
One could legitimately argue that a model describing foreign invest-
ment as a function of current alternative rates of return neglects important
components of the anticipated return to investments made today. Similar con-
cerns Lth respect to domestic investment have led to increased use of models
based on Tobin's "q" theory of investment. By relating investment to the ratio
("q") of the stock market valuation of existing assets to the replacement costs
of those assets, this theory incorporates anticipated future rate—of—return
changes which are reflected in current market values.
This "forward—looking't approach to investment has a great deal to
recommend it. Unfortunately, no direct application to foreign investment is
possible, since the market does not provide a separate valuation of domestic and
foreign assets owned by a U.S. multinational firm. Rather, we have available a—20—
variety of estimates of qt? which are largely, but not, of course, totally,
representative of domestic capital and no estimate of the corresponding "q."
It is worth noting that domestic investment models of the "q" type are subject to
the criticism that the desirability of domestic and foreign investment are con-
founded in the tq measure.
In order to confirm our results from Section III that the increasel
attractiveness of domestic investment tends to reduce foreign investraent, we
're ignore the problem and estimate a model in which is a function of only "q"
and a variable removing 19714 from consideration, as above. Using the "q"
measure reported in Summers (1981) produces equation (114).






While this model does not produce the precise explanation of foreign investment
we obtained with the rate of returns equations, the "q" coefficient is highly
significant and of the expected negative sign, and the is similar to the
values given in similar domestic investment equations. Summers also presents
data which allow us to construct a tax—adjusted value q', which takes into
account the effects of accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit on
investment incentives. Reestimation using q' produces:—21—





Thatis, the tax—adjusted "q'T provides a slightly worseexplanation.More
worrisomeis the fact that the residual for 1913 is so large as to account for
over seventy percent of the total residual variance. It is obvious from the
data that our exclusion of any information on the attractivenessof investment
abroad haspreventedthese equations from explaining the large investment
increase in 1973, which r*(1 —t*)was able to explain in the Section III
regressions. Since an outlier like 1973 can so drastically affect theresults,
equations (ib) and (15) were re—run excluding 1973 information byuse of a
second dunmr variable.
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This time, the tax—adjusted variable performs slightly better. Otherwise, the-22—
coefficients of the "q" variables are virtually identical to the previous set.
Clearly, the significant results were not an artifact of the one outlier.
Usingthis very different model of investment has tended to confiri:i
our previous conclusions: that the attractiveness of domestic investment has a
significant negative impact on the level of foreign investment. The results
regarding domestic tax effects are not nearly so strong as in the previous
model,but Summers found the results on domestic investment to be mixed as well.
Summer' s parameter estimates were unstable, but our coefficients are between
about ten percent and fifty percent as large in absolute value as his estimated
effects on domestic investment (and, of course, the opposite sign). In
conclusion, the "q" modelofinvestment, despite its obvious shortcoming of
allowingnomeasurement of a "q" for investment abroad, has added evidence in
favorof our previous results.
IV. Implicationsand Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper points to U.S. multinational
firms being strongly influenced in their decisions to reinvest earnings abroad
by the after—tax rate of return abroad compared to that available in the U.S.
Withreinvestment of earnings now being the predominant form of U.S. foreign
directinvestment and with foreign direct investment representing a sizable part
of thetotal investment of U.S. firms, theimpact on the relative return to
foreigninvestment should, it would seem, be an important factor in evaluating
proposed tax changes.
In particular, the theoretical model argues that changes in the tax
treatment of corporate earnings, even when these changes apply to both domestLc
and foreign source income, can have effects on the incentive to invest abroad—23—
versus at home. This surprising result follows because the tax on foreign
source income is deferred until income is repatriated. Thus the tax is best
thought of as a tax on dividends and, as such, can be shown to have no effect on
the foreign subsidiary's optimal reinvestment decision. Changes in the tax
treatment of domestic income, on the other hand, do change the relative attrac-
tiveness of investing at horse, and so, can affect foreign investment if there is
substitutability. Since most provisions of the U.S. tax law apply to income
wherever earned, tax policy changes often appear to affect foreign and domestic
investment incentives similarly, but, according to this theory, can be far from
neutral.
The empirical evidence supports the conclusions of the model and indi-
cates that domestic tax policy has powerful effects on decisions to invest
abroad at the expense, in the aggregate, of investment at home. We estimate
that an effective tax rate change which would increase domestic investment by
one dollar would, at the same time, cut U.S. investment abroad by at least
twenty cents (taking into account only the estimated impact on the reinvestment
decision).
How this conclusion might influence the support for investment incen-
tives clearly depends on the reasons that increased capital formation is
favored. For instance, if concern over labor productivity or the "overall
strength of the economy" make increasing the level of domestic productive assets
one's goal, the considerations raised here would be of little importance. Of
course, one who did not accept the evidence that total investment responds to
tax policy might still favor the shift toward domestic investment implied by our
estimated tax effects.—2 —
Onthe other hand, many view increased capital formation as a way to
promote "international competitiveness," and might argue that operating abroad
tends to promote exports, so that any decline in foreign investment would be
counterproductive. This position is, of course, controversial, as some evidence
points to foreign investment substituting for exports.
Those who support investment incentives on economic welfare grounds
might find their case altered by the recognieion of international investment
effects. Since the welfare argument centers on the discouragement to investment
produced by the tax wedge between private and social returns, the finding that
the total investment effect is exaggerated by at least one—fourth by looking at
onlydomestic investment might be thought to weaken the argument. However, such
a conclusionneglects the issue of sectoral misallocation of capital. As has
been noted by p. 4usgrave (1969), the foreign tax credit produces an unfavorable
allocation of capital, from the standpoint of "national welfare," because the
nation receives only the after—foreign—tax return to capital invested abroad
while receiving the gross return to capital invested at home. The multinational
firm, responding to after—tax rates of return, is encouraged to invest abroad
even when the national return at home exceeds that abroad. That argument is
much strengthened by our conclusion that the firm's reinvestment decision is
based on a comparison of the after—foreign—taxforeign return with the after—tax
domesticreturn. Any policy, such as a tax cut, which results in domestic
investment at the expense of foreign investment, by helping correct this
misallocation of capital, produces a welfare gain in addition to the gain from
any increase in total investment. Furthermore, one might beconcerned about
worldwide economic welfare. As we have shown, the effective tax rate onforeign—25—
source income, as viewed from the perspective of a reinvesting subsidiary, is
given by the host country tax alone. Thus, if the home country effective tax
rate is brought closer to the host tax rate, worldwide economic efficiency gains
should follow, as capital is reallocated toward its most productive use.
The results reported here, while confirming the importance of domestic
tax effects on international invesbrnent, are only a beginning. For example, the
investment in the U.S. by foreign firms has been completely ignored. While that
investment is also growing rapidly in importance, the specification of tax
incentives provided by each foreign country's treatment of foreign source income
and the availability of data present more difficult problems than those
confronted in this paper.—26—
Footnotes
*The author is Executive Director of the National Bureau of Economic
Research and Associate Professor of Economics, Harvard University. I am gra;e—
ful to Alan Auerbach, AngusDeaton,and participants in seminars at the NBER,
Harvard, and NYU Business School for their suggestions. ta Resources, Inc.,
generously provided access to their data and statistical estimation systems.
1-See Feldstein (forthcoming). This work has generated much controversy.
See, for example, Fair (1981).
2Foreign direct investment, as distinguished from portfolio investment,
takes place in a foreign operation over which the U.S. parent firm has control.
3For several reasons, foreign direct investment figures cannot be thought of
as the precise equivalent of the domestic investment numbers. One difference is
that the net domestic investment figures cited by Feldstein are obtained by
subtracting from gross investment a depreciation figure adjusted for such fac-
tors as inflation to approximate as closely as possible economic depreciation.
Given the different currencies in which some foreign subsidiaries' books are
kept as well as the variety of depreciation practices prevailing in different
areas, the Commerce Department makes no attempt to similarly adjust the book
depreciation figures used in computing foreign investment.
In addition, foreign direct investment is most accurately thought of
as a financial transaction: an implicit or explicit supply of parent firm
funds to a foreign affiliate. To the extent that additional funds are borrowed
abroad or supplied by foreign "minority" owners, our figures understate the—27—
investment undertaken abroad under the control of U.S. firms. On the other
hand, foreign direct investment does not necessarily mean purchase of real
assets and, so, may overstate the foreign equivalent of domestic net fixed
investment. However, the tendency of foreign financing to be short—term
(Robbins and Stobaugh (1973, Ch. 4)) and the incentive to minimize exchange risk
by financing current assets, but not fixed assets, through foreign short—term
borrowing (Robbins and Stobaugh (1972)), both imply that foreign direct invest-
ment may be an adequate indicator of net fixed investment abroad.
The estimates of Kopits (1980) provide dramatic confirmation of this
theory.The elasticity of the stock of foreign direct investment with respect
tototal subsidiary assets is almost identically one (1.014), while the corresponding
derivative (.351) is very close to the typical share of plant and equipment
• • • tdirect investment in total subsidiary assets .4o. Kopits estimated
total subsidiary assets
of .351 (estimated with a 1966 cross section of countries) is virtually iden—
Lx fixedinvestment in subsidiaries tical to the value, .36,of implied by the Ltotal subsidiary assets
time series (1958—65) estimates of Robbins and Stobaugh (1972). Thus, even
thoughdata limitations force us tofollow the usual practice of using foreign
directinvestmentfiguresasif they represented net fixed investment (See
Goldsbrough (1919)), there is ample evidence to support this procedure.
careful reading of Goldsbrough reveals a precise treatment of the "net
versus gross" problem in the remainder ofthe paper.
surveyof the relevant empirical iork can be found in Hufbauer (1975).
Frisch (1981) provides some evidence that rates of return influence the distri-
bution of investment across foreign countries, but whether relative rates of—28—
return influence the total amount of foreign investment is an open question.
6Theexistence of differential risk patterns across countries, providing
opportunities for diversification which individuals may not be able to pursue
except through the operations of multinational firms, casts doubt on the
stronger proposition that the firm's desired capital stock in each region would
be at the level required to equalize marginal returns. Recognition of the risk
factor suggests its inclusion in the model of the foreign investment decision.
However, risk serves to complicate the analysis, without holding potential for
measurement in the present context, and so, it is ignored here. As will be
clear from Section III, this amounts to assuming that the riskiness of antici-
pated returns on foreign investment as a whole is unrelated to the mean return
over time.
TThe author owes this observation to Stewart Myers.
8For discussions of these aspects of foreign investment, see Caves (1911)
and Vernon (1971, Ch. 3 and 1).
9For simplicity, we will consider the two—country case here.
-0It should be noted that, while the statutory tax rate on domestic incore
equals that on foreign—source income, some provisions of the law, such as
allowable depreciation, do differ. Therefore t should not necessarily be thought
of as the effective tax rate applied to domestic income, although the two rates
might be highly correlated over time.
11Horst explicitly examines the dependence of p on tax parameters in his—29—
1977 paper, but is forced to utilize an observed value to weight tax rates in
his calculations.
firm with an excess of foreign tax credits faces alternatives of
(i —4)(l+r)versus (i —t)(i+r*(1—
13Theone exception to this fairly general proposition is the case of a sub-
sidiary which, according to the rates—of—return test just described, would
repartriate earnings but which also anticipates more profitable opportunities in
the "near future." Just as it is not optimal for a subsidiary to repatriate
earnings and receive capital transfers simultaneously, an optimal strater would
not involve repatriating earnings and receiving capital transfers very soon
thereafter. Thus, a firm might be willing to reinvest abroad over the short run
even when the investment does not produce an acceptable one—period after—foreign
income—tax rate of return when compared to the opportunity cost. That is, the
conclusion is even more at odds with the conventional wisdom, which sets higher
standards for reinvestment, than is our basic result. Since this lock—in effect
is the product of a very special pattern of expected future returns and of the
time period over which r* is measured, it is not very interesting conceptually
and is ignored in the remaining analysis.
114A notable exception is the work of Kopits (1972, 1980), whofocuses on the
repatriation decision, arguing that higher deferrable U.S. taxes on foreign
source income increase the "cost of repatriation" and, hence, encourage rein-
vestment.
15mese results are derived more explicitly in Hartman (1981).—30—
're l6hile
-y--isnot an obviOus choice as a dependent variable, the analysis
was repeated for deflated Ie and for Ie as a fraction of the direct investment
stock, with no important effect on the results.
l7r*(l —t*)is "reinvested earnings" (Ie) plus "income from interest,
dividends, and earnings of unincorporated affiliates" (both from "Balance of
Payments" tables in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Survey of Current Business, selected issues), divided by "direct investment
position" (from Survey of Current Business, August, 1980, 'Dable 11, and previous
issues). It is adjusted for anticipated inflation by subtracting the new—issue
long—term corporate bond rate, courtesy of Data Resources, Inc. The results are
similar with other estimates of expected inflation.
l8DTlr is a dumnr variable for l97L to represent both "speculative
activity" and, more importantly, a $7 billion plus—fall in the direct investment
stock caused by the acquisition, by Middle Eastern countries, of oil company
assets (see Goldsbrough (1979)).
the expense of comparability with the Feldstein results for domestic
investment, the basis model s.as also estimated in logs with ln(r) and ln(i—t)
having separate coefficients. The coefficients did not differ significantly and
the coefficient of ln(l—t) was statistically significant, at the .05level.
20Al1 of these data were taken from International Financial Statistics
published by the International bnetary Fund, various issues.
21Feldstein lags r in his equation. Since foreign direct investment Ls—31—
measured as the financial transaction, rather than the resulting real capital
investment, the use of lagged values seems less appropriate here. Nevertheless,
when equation (8)wasrunwith lagged returns, the r coefficient wasavery
similar.0608 and still statistically significant.—32—
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